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The Android security architecture leverages the traditional Linux
operating security controls to protect a user’s data. However, user-
based permissions models and application sandboxes do not mitigate
the vulnerability of side-channels.
We demonstrate power consumption as a side-channel on mobile
devices. While web pages may look aesthetically similar, the web
browser exercises different behaviors while rendering the underlying
code. The variance between the browser’s behavior and power
consumption implies that different webpages consume different
amounts of power. Thus, webpages can be uniquely identified from
one another by analyzing power traces collected during a page load.
Side-channel attacks have not been studied for general purpose
systems such as mobile devices. In our evaluation, we use this side-
channel to reveal a mobile user’s browsing activity from the hardware
level power traces from the CPU, GPU, PMIC and DRAM with an
80% accuracy.




















Our experiments are performed on real hardware and mainstream
mobile operating system that simulates a comparable attack on a
mobile device. In this section, we discuss our testing infrastructure
that allows us to conduct a power side-channel attack on a mobile
device.
Power Collection: traces are collected from an externally
instrumented evaluation board. Sense resistors are attached to the
PMIC, CPU, GPU, and DRAM.
Collecting Traces: Prior to identifying browser behavior, we create a
database of signatures corresponding to the applications power
consumption which is either stored on the device or a remote server.
Immediately before the page load, the ARM Gator begins gathering
raw power traces from 4 different channels: PMIC, CPU, GPU and
DRAM. This daemon runs for 30 seconds after the initial page load.
Signature Generation: The initial data contains 30 seconds worth of
sampled data, but later trimmed to 5 seconds. The trace is then
converted into the frequency domain. Each spectrogram is a set of
tuples which keep track of a magnitude and a frequency for that
magnitude, essentially forming a histogram of magnitudes for a given
webpage trial.
We use the k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN) algorithm for initial
classification. kNN is a simple algorithm that identifies the k-nearest
neighbors of a given feature vector c using their Euclidian distance.
In the case of our experiment, we use the frequency of magnitudes
derived from the time series power trace as the features, and the
webpage’s name as the label. Running this classifier allows us to classify
the given feature vector c with the label of a webpage.
After using this classifier, we can use a confusion matrix, also known as
an error matrix, to visualize the accuracy of the model. The results are
shown in the figures above.
To evaluate our attack, we perform a 10-fold cross validation for each
parameter configuration. We used 5 different parameters, varying k from
1 through 5. This process splits our signature database into a 90/10
training/test set respectively. This technique allows us to see how well
our model would perform in practice, without necessitating testing single
unknown traces.
Time-series power traces for a webpage load
are specific, consistent and distinguishable.
20 traces were collected for each website to
generate an accurate signal for signature
recognition with kNN.
The attack can be down-sampled to roughly
200 Hz while keeping the same accuracy.
The original attack consists of 5000
features, and an attack at 200 Hz consists of
simply 25 features.
To this end, a random DVFS governor to vary the CPU frequency in 
an attempt to mitigate the attack. Dynamic Voltage and Frequency 
Scaling (DVFS) is a commonly used technique to alter the frequency 
of  the CPU, on the fly, to conserve power. Essentially, DVFS uses a 
reduction in CPU clock frequency to reduce supply voltage, and thus 
save power. 
Information leakage is a pervasive problem, not limited to the
hardware-level. Temporal changes in any part of the mobile system
stack propagate to the lower levels. It is possible to correlate this
seemingly insignificant leaked data to reveal a user’s secrets.
- Power traces for webpage loads are specific and consistent. They can
be used by an attacker to reverse engineer a user’s browsing history.
- This attack can be mitigated either by adding noise to the power trace
or removing the signal.
- Random DVFS governor was built to add coarse grained noise to the
power trace. This effectively mitigated a kNN based attack, but
cannot provably be mitigated other techniques.
The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for the default Android 
governor (interactive) and the Random DVFS governor show that the 
features with the highest variance are significantly less clustered. 
